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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NETWORKING 
 
 
 
In the light of some new aspects of the 
EU functioning, particularly, the recovery 
from the 2008—2009 global crisis, transpor-
tation and energy development projects are 
coming to the forefront in the Baltic Sea re-
gion. At the same time, there is a need to con-
sider EU’s recent adoption of a common 
seven-year financial programme (2014—
2020), which serves, in effect, as the Union’s 
budget. Given that, one may conclude that the 
countries of the Baltic Sea region are enter-
ing a new stage of their development. 
The authors analyse the role and signifi-
cance of transportation and energy projects 
as an instrument of economic development. 
Having studied the largest transport and en-
ergy projects in the Baltic region, the authors 
show that the new infrastructure networks 
supported the investment expansion of Swed-
ish and Finnish companies into the post-
communist countries of the Baltic Region, 
which in its turn, allowed Nordic investors to 
expand their domestic markets. 
The analysis also shows that the experi-
ence of private businesses proves a recent 
theoretical concept — the pyramid of re-
gional development factors. As a result, the 
actual regional policy of the EU cannot be 
considered in the narrow sense of the Cohe-
sion Policy alone. 
 
Key words: Transport networks, energy 
networks, Baltic Region, EU Cohesion Po-
licy, regional policy, regional development 
 
 
Over many years, the European Un-
ion has been pursuing a supranational re-
gional policy aimed at convergence of the 
socioeconomic development of EU mem-
ber states and their regions. At the same 
time, the key indicator for classifying a 
territory as a problematic one in the 
framework of the so-called EU Cohesion 
Policy is GDP per capita. However, as 
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the 2008—2009 global economic crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt cri-
sis showed, the short-term success in GDP per capita convergence should 
not deceive anybody — sustainable development of the EU periphery territo-
ries can be ensured only through the transformation of a number of regional 
development factors. One of the efficient tools to attain this goal is imple-
mentation of transport and energy infrastructure construction projects. 
 
Engineering infrastructure as the key factor  
of regional development in the Baltic Sea region 
 
The year of 2014 is the beginning of a new 7-year financial period in the 
EU, which entails, among other things, a revision of the principles of the EU 
Cohesion Policy. Alongside numerous changes aimed at increasing the eco-
nomic efficiency of this policy, its basic principles remained similar to those 
characteristic of 2007—2013. For example, problem-prone regions are iden-
tified on the basis of GDP per capita (PPP). At the same time, the GDP level 
determines not only the volume of allocated funds, but also the amount of 
co-financing by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
European Social Fund (ESF). Apart from the traditional group of less devel-
oped regions, whose GDP is below 75 % of the EU average, there is a transi-
tion group with GDP per capita of 75—90 % of the EU average (earlier, the 
90 % threshold was of relevance only to the Cohesion Fund, whereas the 
ERDF and ESF identified eligible regions in a different way). As before, the 
less developed regions are represented in the Baltic region by Estonia, Lat-
via, Lithuania, and some Polish voivodeships. The German state of Meck-
lenburg-Vorpommern and East Finland belong to the transition group [7]. 
Priorities of supranational regional policy of the EU are still broad and 
unclear. For example, the ERDF is planning to contribute to the economic, 
social, and territorial cohesion of the European Union through reducing in-
terregional disparities in nine areas. Special attention is paid to supporting 
R&D and innovations, improving access to ICT and its quality, mitigating 
climate change and transition towards a low-carbon economy. The ESF has 
identified four priority areas, the most important of which is increasing em-
ployment and supporting labour mobility. At the same time, our calculations 
based on reports on expected expenditure on the identified areas show the 
absence of common EU financial priorities. For some regions, the above-
mentioned four priority areas appearing at the bottom of the list (for in-
stance, telecommunication, energy and transport infrastructure — ranked 
sixth by the ERDF) may prove to be the major ones. 
In our opinion, such flexibility of priorities within the EU Cohesion Policy 
is an advantage. To a large degree, it is a product of the aspiration to take into 
account specific problems faced by each region. Several years ago, experts 
identified new threats to regional development, which the EU will face more 
and more often in the decades to come. It helped compile a common list of co-
hesion policy priorities [13]. However, all efforts to actively involve local au-
thorities into the regional policy implementation do not produce the desired 
effect in many EU periphery regions. Unprofessionalism of local officials does 
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not lead to the development of tools and methods which are unique for a par-
ticular region, but rather to inept adaptation of the approaches of more devel-
oped territories, which are unsuitable for backward regions [4]. 
As recent research of Russian political scientists specialising in regional-
ism shows, there is a pyramid of regional development factors (by analogy to 
the pyramid of needs). The hierarchy of these factors suggests that the most 
complex ones are activated only if the basic factors are sufficiently favour-
able for economic development. So, O. V. Kuznetsova identifies five levels 
of the pyramid of regional development factors. The innovative activity of 
population, which is increasingly encouraged by the EU, is placed at the top 
of the pyramid (such ‘inertial’ factors as environmental and climatic condi-
tions and resources are at the bottom of the pyramid). Innovative activities 
can be encouraged in highly developed regions, but they can hardly become 
the development drive in regions bereft of a sufficiently dense infrastructure 
network (which is the second level of the pyramid together with the popula-
tion distribution system). Neither do they work in the regions characterised 
by an ‘old’ industry-specific structure, which does not require significant ex-
penditure on R&D (the third level) [3]. 
The Baltic macroregion may serve as an excellent illustration of this 
concept. On the one hand, after the 2004 EU enlargement, all Baltic coun-
tries (except the Russian territories) became members of the common eco-
nomic space of the EU. On the other hand, certain Baltic regions differ not 
only in the level of economic development, but also in their industrial spe-
cialisation and the infrastructure development level. Although Sweden lags 
behind smaller countries of Western and Central Europe in the density of its 
transport infrastructure (especially modern one) due to the climatic condi-
tions and low population density, the country is well ahead of the most de-
veloped regions of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the coastal voivodeships 
of Poland (see table). 
 
The availability of transport infrastructure in the countries  
and regions of the Baltic macroregion as of 2008 (km / 1,000 km2) 
 
Motorways 
Country/region Railroads
Railroads with 
two or more 
tracks high-quality other 
Lithuania 27 5.8 4.7 1236 
Latvia 37.3 4.7 — 1026 
Estonia 20.3 2.4 2.3 1289 
Finland: 17.5 1.7 2.2 231 
Western and Southern 
Finland Åland Islands 26.9 5.1 5.8 353 
Northern and Eastern 
Finland 12.9 — 0.4 172 
Sweden: 25 4.1 4.1 219 
Stockholm 58.2 34.6 38.4 367 
Eastern Central Sweden 43.8 15.3 12.3 366 
Småland and islands 32.4 5.7 5.6 381 
Southern Sweden 63.2 14.6 20.2 619 
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End of the table 
 
Motorways 
Country/region Railroads
Railroads with 
two or more 
tracks high-quality other 
Regions of Western and 
Northern Sweden 19.7 1.6 1.6 165 
Denmark 49.5 21.5 26.2 1675 
Germany: 105.8 53 35.4 611 
Schleswig-Holstein 81.7 31.6 32.3 593 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 66 22 23.2 407 
Other states 110 56.3 36.5 627 
Poland: 64.6 27.9 2.4 1223 
West Pomeranian 
Voivodeship 53 18.4 1 783 
Pomeranian  
Voivodeship 68.1 19.6 
3.6 
(0 in 2007) 1083 
Warmian-Masurian 
Voivodeship  50 12.4 0 892 
Other voivodeships 66.8 31 0.4 240 
For comparison 
Netherlands 69.5 47.7 62.2 3199 
Belgium 117.2 100.9 57.8 3877 
Czech Republic 121.6 24.2 8.8 697 
Hungary 83.1 14.5 13.7 2096 
 
Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of Eurostat data (Road, rail and navigab-
le inland waterways networks by NUTS 2 regions. URL: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
 
Poor development of transport and energy infrastructure of certain Baltic 
region countries in comparison to the EU leaders is consistent with a lower 
GDP per capita, which accounts for increased attention to the development 
of infrastructure networks in the Baltic macroregion. At the same time, such 
projects are financed not only in the framework of the supranational regional 
policy of the EU; it tends to support smaller projects in the framework of 
comprehensive regional programmes). 
 
The legal framework of infrastructure development 
 in the Baltic Sea region 
 
Three documents can be considered as defining the status of transport 
and energy networks of the Baltic macroregion: The EU Strategy for the Bal-
tic Sea Region adopted in 2009, the Declarations of the Second Pan-Euro-
pean Transport Conference held in Crete in 1994 (additions were made at 
the next conference in Helsinki in 1997), and the Third Energy Package. 
It is reasonable to focus on the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea region [9], 
since it is not a European document common to all EU members but the one 
specifically tailored for the Baltic Sea region. Its authors, as well as inde-
pendent experts interpret the Strategy quite broadly — as a conceptual 
document for the complex development of the Baltic Sea region. For in-
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stance, N. V. Smorodinskaya sees the Strategy as a precursor of the closely 
related network economy and cluster theory. She emphasises that the adop-
tion of the document is the first and a new step in the conceptual framework 
of the EU functioning. It manifested in the replacement of the supranational-
ity principle of integration processes with the cluster one [5]. EU scholars 
strive to prove that the Strategy is not a devaluation of the pan-European in-
tegration principle, but rather an example of a new strategy for integration 
through regionalisation. They believe that this document does not give the 
Baltic countries full control of the region, but rather increases and extends 
the controlling functions of the European Union through granting it the 
rights to establish contacts and hold dialogue not only with national govern-
ments but also with local authorities (regions of certain countries) [1]. 
At the same time, it is important to take account of the fact that the de-
velopment and adoption of the Strategy coincided with the global economic 
crisis. Moreover, this document was ratified almost simultaneously with the 
detailed EU programme for the Baltic Sea region for 2007—2013 [15]. In 
this light, the Strategy seems to be a new conceptual approach of the EU, 
which suggests placing financial and organisational responsibility for the 
economic conditions of the investment countries, especially smaller and less 
diversified ones, on investing states. It is not a coincidence that the Baltic 
macroregion, where the Nordic countries are expected to take responsibility 
for resolving the crisis in the Baltics, was chosen as a pilot region. In the 
framework of the corresponding EU programme, current projects can be di-
vided into four groups — energy, water, innovation, and transport. 
 
Motorway and railway projects 
 
The best-known project in the Baltics is Via Baltica. It focuses on the 
functioning of a motorway included in the system of pan-European transport 
corridors approved at the conference in Crete in 1994 for the accelerated de-
velopment of transport infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe [11]. It 
is a part of European route 67 (Helsinki-Prague) stretching from Tallinn via 
Riga and Kaunas to Warsaw and almost repeats the railway route known as 
Rail Baltica. The latter connects Helsinki with Warsaw but, unlike Via Bal-
tica, stretches further to Berlin. Finland and Estonia are connected by ferries 
crossing the Gulf of Finland. The possibility of constructing an undersea 
tunnel is also being considered. Within the transport corridor classification, 
both routes — Via Baltica и Rail Baltica — comprise Pan-European Corri-
dor I, which also includes a branch road to Kaliningrad. At first, Via Baltica 
was not a responsibility of the EU, but, in the end, the European Union took 
over 80 % of financing. 
Participating countries differ in their attitude towards Via Baltica. The 
most interested parties are Estonia and Lithuania. The former is interested in 
Via Baltica as an additional channel of economic integration with Finland, 
whereas Lithuania strives to control a part of transit cargoes crossing the Bal-
tic. It is worth noting that Lithuania’s Kaunas has a competitive advantage: it 
can reduce the distance to the Baltic coast by a third in comparison to other 
Baltic States and makes it possible to opportunely redirect cargoes elsewhere. 
A. Kuznetsov, V. Olenchenko  
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Lithuania plans to develop an intermodal terminal of European significance. 
Poland is stalled by environmental concerns, since Via Baltica crosses nature 
conservation areas. Latvia’s interest mainly concerns with the motorway ac-
cess to Kaliningrad and Gdansk — the branch called Via Hanseatica. 
Another motorway project strengthening connection between Scandina-
via and continental Europe is the Øresund Bridge running from Denmark 
(Copenhagen) to Sweden (Malmö). The project became one of the 30 priori-
ties of the European Commission (No. 11) in the framework of the TEN-T 
programme (Trans-European Transport Networks) and the first one that has 
been fully implemented [14]. This dual carriage bridge-tunnel supports two 
railway tracks beneath four road lanes running over the Øresund Strait. 
Alongside the Øresund Bridge, the Nordic-Baltic transport link includes the 
Great Belt Fixed Link connecting three Danish islands. The project is part of 
route E20 running from the Irish port of Shannon to Saint Petersburg. 
The project implemented by the beginning of 2000 was supported by pri-
vate investors that received long-term loans guaranteed by the Danish and 
Swedish governments. Half of the managing companies working in Denmark 
and Sweden belong to these states. The project is expected to pay off by 2035. 
For passengers, the fare for using this route approached the ferry fare during 
the economic crisis. It is worth noting that the project laid the ground for the 
successful functioning of a Euroregion (unlike the still less successful Eurore-
gion Saule based on Via Hanseatica) — a local type integration model devel-
oped by the EU in the framework of cross-border cooperation [2]. 
The abovementioned Rail Baltica project aimed at connecting railway net-
works of Finland, the Baltics, and Central European countries is another priority 
identified by the European Commission (project No. 27). Its expected financing 
structure is as follows: 50 % is provided by the EU in the framework of the 
TEN-T programme, 50 % is provided by the participants (predominantly, public 
investment in view of the type of ownership of most railway companies). 
Special interest in the project was expressed by Lithuania, which insisted 
on the route cross Kaunas rather than port cities (as its neighbours did) being 
guided by two motives — turning Kaunas into a regional logistics hub and 
transporting oil. At the moment, oil is delivered to the refinery in Mažeikiai 
(North-West Lithuania) from a sea terminal in Būtingė by rail (161 km). 
From the point of view of economic logistics, it is easier to connect Latvia 
and Lithuania; the distance from Mažeikiai to Latvia is only 5 km. In this 
case, the delivery distance will be reduced to 30 km. However, it will be 
more economical to deliver oil to the refinery from the Latvian port of 
Liepāja, which will deprive the port of Klaipeda and Lithuanian Railways of 
their significant income. 
The Rail Baltica project was not completed in due time (2007—2012). 
Consequently, it had to undergo some rebranding. In 2013, the EU trans-
formed it into RBGC — Rail Baltica Growth Corridor [12]. At the same 
time, the EU Delegation to Russia initiated and financed a study into the 
possibility of involving Saint Petersburg into the project with the prospect of 
introducing Russian cargoes to the key intermodal centres of the EU. 
The structure of financing remains the same: 50 % is provided by the EU 
in the framework of the TEN-T programme, and 50 % is provided by the par-
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ticipants. The project is divided into three parts: Saint Petersburg — Helsinki 
— Tallinn; Latvia — Lithuania; Poland — Germany. The role of Estonia, its 
interest in the project is increasing. However, we believe, the project of con-
necting Saint Petersburg seems to be hardly feasible in view of the multi-
functional port of Ust-Luga gathering steam but working at the moment at 
1/3 of its capacity, to say nothing of the Saint Petersburg Sea Port and the 
diversified direct connection between Russia and Estonia. An important fac-
tor is to be taken into account: beneficiaries of the terminal in Ust-Luga are 
leading Russian companies enjoying the status of transnational companies 
and being major suppliers of export cargoes. Moreover, the RBGC can be 
viewed as a competitor to the port of Ust-Luga. 
At the same time, the European Commission is promoting a project enti-
tled Rail Baltica 2. The project aims at extending the RBGC project to the 
ports of Northern Italy. So far, it has been discussed only as an idea. The 
first presentation of possible routes took place in the summer of 2013. The 
Baltics are especially sceptical about Rail Baltica 2 from the perspective of 
cargo and passenger flows. Apparently, in view of the attitude of the Baltics, 
the European Commission declared its readiness to take over 80—85 % of 
financing. However, it does not impress Estonia and Latvia, whose officials 
are critical of the project because its operation will become the responsibility 
of national, state-owned railway companies, and thus will become an addi-
tional burden for the state budget, since the Baltics are convinced that the 
Rail Baltica 2 route will be definitely unprofitable. We believe that both pro-
jects — RBGC и Rail Baltica 2 (also with a connection to Saint Peters-
burg) — are likely to gain practical significance in a long-term perspective 
in case the Northern Sea Route is put into full operation. 
In a short-term perspective, the development of the RBGC and Rail Baltica 
2 routes will have ambiguous effect on the Baltic macroregion. It will require 
redistribution of cargo and passenger flows among the countries, as well as be-
tween rail and air transport. At the moment, cargoes and passengers, which the 
abovementioned railway projects can make a claim for, are transported by road, 
since (transit) capacity should not be considered insufficient. One can hardly 
speak of a prospect of a radical increase in economic activity in the region, 
which would require extra logistics. Moreover, the costs associated with railway 
and motor transport have not been compared yet. It is possible that the delivery 
price will increase. At the same time, the role of private business, which ac-
counts for a significant percent of motor transportation, will decrease. 
 
Main gas pipelines in the Baltic region states 
 
Although gas pipelines can greatly affect the development of a number 
of territories in the Baltic region, they hardly have a direct bearing on the re-
gional policy. As it will be shown below, the economic and political compo-
nent of almost all projects goes beyond the borders of the Baltic Sea region. 
The already existing network can transform their status under the influence 
of the EU Gas Directive of 2009 suggesting ownership unbundling of gas pro-
duction from transportation (gas networks) and distribution [8]. Moreover, this 
Directive has become another irritant in the Baltics-Russia relations. 
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Although the Directive contains an exemption for the energy market of 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland, which is acknowledged as a natural 
isolated market, and thus allows these states to apply the rules of the Direc-
tive voluntarily, their reactions differed significantly. 
Latvia decided to take advantage of this exemption by formulating the 
factor and time framework for the future implementation of the Gas Direc-
tive. Latvia will commence liberalisation when the pipeline between Lithua-
nia and Poland (at the design stage today) starts operating, or a terminal en-
suring liquefied gas import (also at the design stage) is constructed. Another 
benchmark is the year 2017, when the licence of Latvijas Gāze will expire. 
Latvijas Gāze is the monopolistic gas trader in the Latvian market (34 % of 
shares owned by Gazprom, 47.2 % by the German E. ON Ruhrgas, 16 % by 
Itera Latvija). 
The until recently incumbent Conservative party (in opposition since Oc-
tober 2012) steered through the Parliament a strict plan of the Third Energy 
implementation, which suggests that Gazprom lose 2/3 of its positions in the 
Lithuanian market. It is expected that Lietuvos dujos (37.1 % owned by Gaz-
prom, 38.9 % by E. ON Ruhrgas, 17.7 % by the Lithuanian Ministry of En-
ergy), which is dominating the market today, will be reorganised in such a 
way that the Russian company will fulfil only the function of its supplier. 
The Lithuanian state will become the owner of the pipeline, i. e. alienation of 
Gazprom’s property will take place, whereas a private Lithuanian company 
will be contracted with gas distribution. 
Similar actions were taken by the incumbent Estonian Reform Party, 
which presented a project in 2010, according to which the Estonian gas 
trader Eesti Gaas (Gazprom — 37 %, E. ON Ruhrgas — 33.7 %, Finnish 
Fortum — 17.7 %, Itera Latvija — 9.9 %) has two years to sell the pipelines; if 
this condition is not met, the state will launch the compulsory purchase proce-
dure. Without consulting the shareholders, the Estonian government has as-
sessed the company’s networks and announced the price that the state is ready 
to pay for the main pipelines — approximately 40 million euros, although 
their market price is much higher. 
The prospects of further changes in the Baltic gas market become evident 
when one considers the project of a gas pipeline between Estonia (Paldiski) 
and Finland (Ingå or Vuosaari) across the seabed of the Gulf of Finland, which 
was called Balticconnector. At the first stage, it will carry gas from the Lat-
vian Inčukalns gas storage facility, where the Baltics collectively own gas. In 
the future, it is expected to supply gas to Finland from the to-be-constructed 
LNG terminal in Estonia (Muuga). The USA and Qatar are considered as pos-
sible suppliers. The cost of Balticconnector is estimated at 100 million euros 
and it will be financed by private investors (Finnish Gasum and Estonian Eesti 
Gaas) with the EU support. The pipeline is expected to be put into operation in 
2015. If necessity arises, it can be used in reverse mode [6]. 
The extension of the Nabucco pipeline to Lithuanian customers via East-
ern Poland, which is being lobbied by Lithuania, can also be considered a 
regional pipeline. In case this idea came to fruition, Lithuania planned to be-
come a transiter of natural gas to Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. Lithuania ex-
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pected the Nabucco extension project to be financed through establishing a 
company combining private and public capital of the Baltics and Finland 
alongside the simultaneous inclusion of this project into the list of EU priori-
ties. The 2008—2009 global crisis made this project irrelevant. 
As to a broader regional context, a project entitled Baltic Gas Intercon-
nector aimed at connecting the gas systems of Germany, Denmark, and 
Sweden in such a way that they could be supplied with gas from the North 
Sea fields. The project was being developed in the mid-2000s. The project 
was expected to be implemented by the countries’ companies working in the 
related fields. The project has been suspended, however, a decrease in de-
mand for natural gas caused by the economic crisis did not withdraw the pro-
ject from the agenda. 
A project of a gas pipeline between Denmark and Poland entitled Baltic 
Pipe and aimed at supplying the Polish economy with Norwegian gas via 
Denmark was considered at the same time and according to an almost identi-
cal algorithm. It shared the fate of the Baltic Gas Interconnector. A certain 
starting point for the construction and functioning of the Baltic Gas Inter-
connector and Baltic Pipe pipeline had to be the Skanled pipeline, which was 
designed to carry gas from Norway to Denmark and Sweden for re-exporta-
tion. The project has also been suspended due to the economic and financial 
instability both in the region and in the world in general. It seems that the 
implementation of the Russian Nord Stream project has become strong com-
pletion to the three gas pipeline projects described above. 
 
Regional power links 
 
The integration of the power systems of Finland and Estonia — Estlink 
— is traditionally seen as the beginning of the accelerating transformation of 
the Baltic power market infrastructure consisting in its reorientation towards 
Northern Europe. The cable laid on the seabed of the Gulf of Finland was 
put into operation in 2007. The project was initiated by Finland and imple-
mented by Nordic Energy Link on the basis of the public-private partnership 
principle (on the part of the Baltics, mostly, in the field of construction and 
operation of power infrastructure). The shareholders of Nordic Energy Link 
have reached a preliminary decision on selling Estlink to private managing 
companies from Estonia and Finland — Elering and Fingrid. 
At the moment, the power supplied via Estlink from Finland is mostly 
consumed in Estonia. In summer, Estlink services are also used by Latvia, 
most of whose generating capacities are hydropower plants, since, in this 
time of year, rivers shallow and the local power production reduces. After 
the Ignalina NPP was closed in 2012, Lithuania also receives power via Es-
tlink. Both these circumstances contribute to stronger Finnish presence in the 
Baltic power market and increase the role of Estonia, since the Estonian 
company Eesti Energia is a beneficiary of Estlink. 
In 2009, the Finnish company Fingrid and Estonian Elering devised a 
plan for laying another undersea cable between Finland and Estonia dubbed 
Estlink 2. If the first link connects, in effect, Helsinki and Tallinn, the second 
A. Kuznetsov, V. Olenchenko  
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link almost reaches the Estonian-Russian border [16]. In 2010, the necessary 
endorsements were received and contracts with future consumers signed. 
Most funding was provided by Fingris, which ensured rapid construction. 
Estlink 2 is expected to be put into operation in the end of 2012 with a per-
spective of an increase in power supply to Latvia and Lithuania. 
Sweden, in its turn, expressed its intention to lay an undersea cable 
dubbed NordBalt (also known as SwedLit) between Nybro (Kalmar County, 
Sweden) and Klaipeda (Lithuania). At the project consideration stage, Latvia 
insisted on the construction of two independent converter stations in Lithua-
nia and Latvia. However, Lithuania managed to secure the plan, according to 
which the converter station is built in Lithuania, wherefrom an additional 
cable might be laid to Latvia. In the first half of 2013, an agreement was 
reached. The project will be implemented by the Lithuanian-Swedish com-
pany Litgrid. The EU will provide 65 % of funding. NordBalt is expected to 
be put into operation in 2015. 
Both projects are connected to the united power system of Northern 
Europe — NordPool. In case of full implementation of the Estlink, Estlink 2, 
and NordBalt projects, the Baltic power market will be almost integrated 
into the Northern European market. Alongside economic responsibilities, 
Northern European legal rules regulating access to the market and aimed at 
isolating this market from ‘strangers’ will come into force. At the same time, 
there is increasing competition between Swedish and Finnish power suppli-
ers, since both countries strive to assume control over the whole power mar-
ket of the Baltics: Finland approaching from the Estonian and Sweden from 
the Lithuanian direction. 
There is also the Lithuanian-Polish project aimed at the development of 
power supply networks and linking them to Lithuania. The project was con-
ceived at Lithuanian initiative when the Ignalina NPP was still operating and 
was aimed at exporting power from Lithuania to Poland. Now it is viewed as 
a possibility to ensure additional power supply to Southern Lithuania in or-
der to create a counterweight to supply from Belarus. We believe that the 
Baltic energy projects should be considered, first of all, in the context of 
transport infrastructure development. The development of transport net-
works, especially electrified railway networks, will inevitably require an in-
crease in power supply. In other words, one can speak of the parallel expan-
sion of two markets — those of cargo flows and power supply — in order to 
ensure cargo and passenger traffic. 
The Nordic countries are becoming an actual regulator of the latter mar-
ket, since Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia signed an agreement on joining the 
NordPool system. There are no factors resulting from the internal develop-
ment of the Baltics that generate the need to increase transit capacities in the 
Baltics. New energy intensive businesses are not emerging, and the existing 
ones do not seem to be expanding, since investment into real economy is not 
increasing. 
The only incentive is a possible increase in power consumption as a re-
sult of the partial or complete implementation of the RBGC and Rail Baltica 
2 projects. Such interconnection between the cargo flow and power markets 
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should ensure stable income for the Nordic suppliers of the latter. In this 
sense, it does not seem coincidental that the EU strategy for the Baltic region 
addresses the development of transport infrastructure in the same section 
with the need to reform the power market. The processes initiated in both 
markets are capable of increasing GDP in a short-term perspective, however, 
they will not create longer-term prospects for the Baltic states. 
 
* * * 
 
The development of infrastructure networks can hardly be considered 
separately from investment in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic, according to 
the Uppsala school of firm internationalisation, is a favourable target for 
Swedish, Finnish, and German investment [10]. However, it is dominated by 
Sweden and Finland. Support for infrastructure project development granted 
by the EU policy is of significant importance. Moreover, one can get an im-
pression that it is Nordic investors that organise this support, since most de-
cisions on reforming Baltic markets were made in the course of Sweden and 
Finland’s EU presidencies. They also create the necessary propaganda at-
mosphere. For instance, the adoption of the Third Energy Package was ac-
companied by Swedish philippics against energy dependence on Russia. 
An analysis of financing sources of large infrastructure projects in the 
Baltic region makes it possible to identify certain common features. As a 
rule, the major investor is the EU, whose contribution ranges from 50 to 80 %. 
In this connection, the project initiators strive to include it on the list of EC 
priorities. Another option is state participation — through purchasing the 
company’s shares, implementing projects, or state guaranteed loans. In case 
of a positive outcome, the implemented projects are offered for privatisation. 
Thus, the convergence of economic development of territories in the 
framework of the Baltic region contributes not to the abstract cohesion of the 
EU member states, but to quite tangible expansion of Northern European in-
ternal market through the post-socialistic countries that acceded to the Union 
in 2004. At the same time, Swedish and Finnish private businesses, as well 
as the national governments, understood much earlier than European offi-
cials or specialists in theoretical regionalism which regional development 
factors are to be addressed first in the periphery Baltic states. So, represent-
ing innovative economics, both Swedish and Finnish investors focused on 
the development of basic infrastructure in the Baltics. 
The article was prepared in the framework of the Basic research pro-
gramme of the Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences No. 31, project 
6.6 ‘International Regional Policy Practices and the Opportunities for their 
Adoption in Russia’. 
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